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Economic cooperation among ldcs (ECDC) is one
item on the UNCTAD agenda which normally
passes with a minimum of fuss. Developed
countries tend to have a bias in favour of
measures which involve ldcs doing things to help
themselves. The developing world, almost by
definition, favours greater solidarity between its
component parts. It is therefore a measure of
the fractiousness of UNCTAD V that the subject
generated considerable ill feeling. The Group of
77 chose to emphasise those aspects of ECDC
which called for greater support from Group B,
either directly or through international agencies.
Group B opposed moves which appeared to com-
promise the 'universality' principle of the UN.
Eventually all agreed to a long and complex
resolution which has been interpreted (by the
select few who can understand it) as giving
greater emphasis to ECDC within the UN
system, and particularly within UNCTAD's work
programme.
In this new preoccupation with ECDC there is a
paradox which this article seeks to explain, On
the one hand there is a long history of failure of
economic integration schemes between ldcs.
Some have flourished briefly and amid much
publicity, later to collapse. Others have advanced
more cautiously, only for caution to lead to
inaction. Yet as the more orthodox market inte-
gration arrangements have been rejected as inap-
propriate, and more unorthodox sectoral agree-
ments have struggled to make any sort of
practical progress, enthusiasm for ECDC has
risen. ECDC was included in the NIEO pro-
gramme adopted at the Sixth Special Session,
and in the Manila Declaration. The Trade and
Development Board of UNCTAD has established
a committee on ECDC. The Group of 77 held
a major conference on the subject in 1976, in
Mexico. It featured prominently in the Arusha
Programme for 'collective self-reliance' (in Feb-
ruary 1979'>. This meeting also adopted a 'Short
Term Action Plan for Global Priorities' on
ECDC. And thence to UNCTAD.
ECDC and Collective Self-reliance
One major reason for the renewed enthusiasm
now being expressed for ECDC is that is gives
Bulletin. 1980, vol. 11 no. I Institute of Development Studies. Sussex
concrete expression to the otherwise somewhat
woolly notion of collective self-reliance (CSR).
Ldcs have been at pains to point out that CSR
does not mean autarchy; 'it does not seek to
build a wall of containment that seals off the
developing countries from the outside world'
(UNCTAD 1977). Rather, it is a combination of
selective measures to promote economic coopera-
tion among ldcs, and to strengthen their bar-
gaining capability vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
The experience of the ASEAN group shows how
these can be combined. The group was originally
formed for reasons not connected with
UNCTAD North-South 'politics (rather as an
expression of anti-communist CSR!). But it has
made advances in practical measures of eco-
nomic cooperation. It has also proved to have
some value in trade policy negotiations. In its
recent dealings with the EEC, Australia and
Japan, ASEAN has impressed its opposite num-
bers, through threats of collective retaliatory
action, as being altogether more substantial than
the sum of its parts. The Andean Group, despite
the amputation of Chile, has otherwise held
together and, with ASEAN, is the most success-
ful of the surviving arrangements. Its common
policy towards foreign investment (Decision 24)
has been weakened but its continued existence
does give the Group's members greater bargain-
ing power in dealing with companies seeking to
play off one member against another. These are
modest beginnings but they give developing
countries a sense of the potential of ECDC in
realising CSR.
Another factor is that whatever the success of
particular integration schemes, there has been a
substantial advance in inter-ldc trade. Manufac-
tured exports from ldcs to other ldcs (over a
20 year period to 1976) 'not only grew faster
than their total imports but also recorded
similar growth rates to their total manufactured
exports' (UNCTAD 1978). Inter-ldc trade as a
proportion of ldc exports of manufactures had
actually increased from 20 per cent in 1960-61 to
24 per cent in 1974-75. Inter-ldc trade as a whole
in the 1970-76 period rose by 9.2 per cent
annually in quantum terms (after 6.5 per cent in
the 1960-70 period) as compared with 6 per cent
for trade between developed countries and 5.8




Of manufacturing inter-ldc trade, totalling $14.8
bn in 1976, $9 bn originated in South and South
East Asia, $3.1 bn in Latin America and only
$0.9 bn in sub-Saharan Africa. Significantly, a
major part of inter-ldc trade by volume has
been within Asia in the absence of any formal
regional grouping, while the growth in Latin
American trade has mainly concerned Brazil,
Argentina and Mexico whose regional exports
have derived only modest encouragement from
the largest Latin American integration scheme,
LAFTA. Another area of major expansion has
been the growth of ldc manufactured exports
(mainly Asian) to the Middle East. This had
grown from $0.2 bn in 1970 to $1.1 bn in 1975
and has greatly expanded since, with a good
many orders for big capital project work still
in the pipeline. In the case of India, for example,
a combination of capital goods exports to the
Middle East and workers' remittances from the
region has offset much of the cost of oil price
increases and done far more to maintain Indian
support for Arab causes than any amount of
political posturing or diplomatic manoeuvring.
The significance of this recent experience of
inter-ldc trade for the future of ECDC is con-
siderable. Ldc exporters have already acquired a
widening range of commercial contacts, famili-
arity with trading procedures, goodwill and
servicing capacity, whose absence hitherto acted
as a barrier to entry and favoured established,
developed country, traders. The existence of this
inter-ldc trade base should make easier any
future attempts to integrate the ldcs' economies
more closely through trade policy measures. It
also suggests much wider possibilities than those
represented by the restricted membership of the
present regional integration groups.
Finally, there has been a deterioration in the pro-
spects for exports to industrialised countries.
Reduced growth in OECD markets and evidence
of increased protectionism have begun to under-
mine the more optimistic assumptions which
underlay economic strategies based on exports,
particularly of manufactures, to these countries.
It is far too soon to say that assumptions and
policies now need to be completely revised but
even the most outward-looking ldcs may now be
inclined to shift, at the margin, towards import
substitution. Import substitution at a multi-
national rather than a national level helps to
reduce the cost of producing scale-sensitive
capital and intermediate goods. Advocates of
ECDC also claim that 'by providing markets
for each other's products developing countries
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will ease the burden of adjustment in developed
countries and make them more amenable to-
wards less restrictive policies' (UN 1979). The
reason why industrialised countries should
welcome adjustment problems in their export
industries (which is what ECDC would entail)
while resisting them in their import competing
industries is obscure. However, welcome or not,
the developed countries are ill-placed to prevent
such third market competition.
The rationale for greater emphasis on ECDC
appears well founded. The question then is what
can be done to promote it. A good place to
start is by looking at the role of the existing
arrangements.
Market Integration Approach to ECDC
A great deal of critical ink has been spilt in
analysis of those ldc regional integration agree-
ments which were based on regional free trade.'
The traditional trade liberalisation, or market
integration, approach has been tried most
recently in East Africa, Central America, the
Caribbean (CARICOM), and former French
West Africa (UDEAC). It also forms a major
ingredient in the Andean and (to a lesser extent)
ASEAN schemes. The traditional approach
derived its inspiration from several sources: the
success of trade liberalisation in Western Europe:
theoretical reasoning, based on assumptions
mainly applicable to industrialised countries,
which pointed to the potential economic efficiency
gains (in static and dynamic terms) from regional
trade liberalisation; and the institutional frame-
work under GATT, which facilitated customs
unions but not partial preferential tariff cutting.
The evidence has pointed (indeed most of this
vvas already clear before 1970) to some negative
conclusions:
the impact of the schemes upon the accele-
ration of growth has been modest. Some
would say it has been 'minimal' and 'its
effect upon the general welfare. .. . has on
the whole been negative' (Wionczek 1978);
'iheralisation was accompanied by a polari-
sation of economic gains and losses, with
the larger and more advanced countries
benefiting disproportionately, despite attempts
to apply corrective measures;
I There is an excellent survey of the literature in Vaitsos(1978) and in Comments by Robson and Wionczek (both
1978), also in Salgado (1978).
the major beneficiaries of regional trade
liberalisation have often been large foreign-
based firms.
Vaitsos (1978) concludes on the basis of this
experience that 'integration should not, in most
cases pursue holistic strategies, but should con-
centrate on specifically identified areas or pro-
jects'.
It does seem, however, that these conclusions
are too stark and negative. In those schemes
which still function tolerably well (such as the
Andean Group), trade liberalisation has done far
more to raise the level of regional trade than any
other instrument and has not in practice proved
a major source of friction. Colombia has
appeared to benefit disproportionately but Chile
left the group for other reasons, notably over
differences concerning foreign investment rules
and the height of the external tariff. The polari-
sation of costs and benefits in market integration
schemes is well documented. But it was not the
main cause for the breakdown of the Central
American Common Market (though it was a
convenient rationalisation of difficulties which
occurred after the 'football war'). Fundamental
political differences between the East African
Community governments (and, earlier, in Malaya
and Central Africa) contributed far more to dis-
integration than the regional balance of gain
and loss (Malaya and Singapore now work
apparently harmoniously in ASEAN, where they
have common political objectives, despite the fact
that Singapore appears to gain most economically
from the arrangement just as it did in the ill-
fated Malayan federation). It is an incon-
venient fact to have to acknowledge for those
whose job it is to promote unity amongst
developing countries, that the hostility between
many neighbouring ldcs is so profound that no
conceivable regional cooperation arrangement
could ever work. For this reason it is almost
pointless to discuss serious economic integration
in the Indian subcontinent, and in most of the
Middle East.
The other, positive, side of the argument is that
the traditional integration arrangements did pro-
duce net gains for their members while they
lasted. The work done by the present writer,
among others, on Central America supports this
conclusion (Cable 1973). It may be that inte-
gration failed to generate wider structural
changes but that was because the basic develop-
ment strategy was misconceived. Import substi-
tuting industrialisation, pursued by the same
governments with the same goals but at extra
cost within national rather than subregional
boundaries, is worse. Another danger of categori-
cally rejecting the market integration approach
is that there may be areas of the world (such
as South East Asia) where this is likely to be
a congenial form of economic cooperation both
for political reasons and because there are
economies with sufficiently robust industrial
sectors which can absorb a certain amount of
competition. Moreover where there is a genuine
commitment to integration there are well under-
stood mechanismsfiscal compensation, partial
non-reciprocity, use of import safeguard measures
to prevent trade liberalisation becoming
seriously disruptive. Nonetheless, despite these
positive factors, there is little doubt that regional
trade liberalisation can only be one part of the
package.
The Sectoral Approach to ECDC
Out of disillusion with pure customs unions
theory applied to ldcs, there has emerged a
modified theory, and practice, based on the
planned development of regional industries. The
theory is based on the proposition that regional
integration can lower the cost of industrial
import substitution where economies of scale
are substantial. With the help of planning models
it is possible to demonstrate the magnitude and
distribution of these savings and a good deal of
work has been done to adapt mathematical
models to particular integration problems.2 Other
work has shown how the solutions to particular
industrial allocation problems can be combined
for different industries to produce optimal solu-
tions, subject to given distributional constraints
(Nugent 1975). It follows from the approach
that the main objective of regional integration
schemes is to isolate the scale-sensitive industries
which benefit from rationalisation at a regional
level and to try to allocate new investment in
a way that produces significant savings but gives
all participating members a worthwhile stake.
The concept of sectoral planning thus combines
a plausible theory with the politically attractive
feature that nervous and nationalistic govern-
ments can hàve close control over the outcome.
It also appeals to economists who have not yet
despaired of sowing the seed of dirigiste eco-
nomic planning in otherwise infertile market
economies. For these reasons sectoral agreements
have come to play a prominent role in the
currently most successful integration schemes,
the Andean and ASEAN groups.
2 The most relevant of these are summarised in Robson(1978). and applied in Cable (1973).
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It has proved extremely difficult, however, to
translate sectoral integration programmes from
the abstract to the concrete. Although it is now
fashionable to write off the Central American
and East African experiments as having failed
because of the damaging 'backwash' effects of
market integration, both incorporated sectoral
planning mechanisms which proved extremely
difficult to operate. Within the Andean group,
after over five years of negotiation, only three
of the eight proposed sectoral agreements have
been signed. One of these, petrochemicals, largely
rationalises an obvious locational distribution
based on Venezuelan feedstock. The third, auto-
mobiles, is still subject to considerable disagree-
ment. ASEAN industry programmes have also
made very slow progress. In both cases inter-
regional trade in the products of 'regional
industries' is a miniscule proportion of the total.
It is not adequate to regard these as teething
difficulties which can be overcome with a little
encouragement from UNCTAD. Those, like the
author, who have spent years experimenting
with spatial and inter-temporal sectoral planning
models for regional integration schemes have to
ask themselves why their work has proved so
difficult to put into practice. One reason is that
it is naïve to expect governments so suspicious
of their neighbours as to be unable to arrive at
arrangements for dealing with imbalances in
overall, inter-regional trade, suddenly to be
transformed into rational, cooperative planners
when they are dealing with particular industries.
On the contrary, experience shows that the
politicisation of every industrial allocation
decision increases rather than decreases the
scope for disagreement and misunderstanding.
Although suspicion and resentment should in
principle be less when the trade outcomes can
be predicted and quantified, outcomes cannot in
practice be so easily predetermined. Planners
and politicians can allocate a car plant to Bolivia
or a chemical plant to Indonesia but they cannot
easily force a private company to go there. Nor
can the technology automatically be bought by
governments off the shelf to undermine a
recalcitrant private enterprise or fill a regional
allocation more quickly. The appalling problems
faced, for example, by Venezuela in getting its
petrochemical complex, El Tablazo, to function
at all should be a salutory warning to those who
believe that the main problem is to get the
investment location and timing decisions right
whilst the entrepreneurial and technical problems
will solve themselves. Further, none of the
existing schemes have proved an effective check
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on governments which, with the backing of
private investors, wish to set up plants in defiance
of regional allocations (other than through the
possibly irrelevant sanction of denial of access
to the regional market).
It is of course easy to pick holes in ambitious
experiments, actual or envisaged. Even an arbi-
tary and industrially illogical regional allocation
of industries may well prove less inefficient than
the competitive duplication of protected plants
conceived in each country independently. More-
over if economic integration has to be approached
cautiously for political reasons, the sectoral
approach may be the best way to start. Nor
are specific projects to be confined only to
industries. Some of the most fruitful sources of
potential economies of scale lie elsewhere, in
building up universities or airlines or in transport
planning. These also depend much less on the
compliance of foreign firms. But the track record
of cooperation in these fields is not impressive
either.
New Approaches to ECDC
ECDC achieved through regional integration
schemes of the kind previously experienced pro-
mises to be a long and difficult business. For
this reason, there is value in looking at other
approaches, some of which UNCTAD and other
agencies are now trying to highlight (UNCTAD
1976, 1976a and 1977). We consider some
examples below.
Managed complementarity
Both the orthodox (trade liberalising), and the
sectoral planning approach to integration focus
upon those elementsmainly manufacturingin
ldc economies, which are actually or potentially
competitive. Though the means are very
different, the end is the same; greater economic
efficiency and the income gains which flow there-
from. But there are potential efficiency gains
other than complementary economic links between
capital- and resource-rich developing countries,
and labour- (and skill-) abundant countries.
Inter-ldc trade already reflects this in part.
In 1975, of the $47 bn of inter-hic trade,
$10 bn was in food and agricultural raw materials
and $22 bn in fuel; in 1970, before oil prices
inflated fuel values, the contribution made to the
total value of inter-ldc trade ($11 bn) was $3.7 bn
by fuel and $3.3 bn by other raw materials. Some
of the most important recent manifestations of
economic cooperation between developing coun-
tries have come from the growing trade and
factor movements between OPEC and non-oil
ldcs. Some of these relations are governed by a
modified form of bilateral barter; eg. the deals
reached by Petrobras of Brazil for Middle East
oil in return for exports of capital goods (and
arms), or for Venezuelan oil in return for
nuclear technology. The rapidly developing com-
mercial diplomacy between India and Iran (at
least under the Shah) covered larger-scale iron
ore sales as well as oil. More complex arrange-
ments have been envisaged in the Caribbean and
the Middle East for building up aluminium
industries based on complementary ldc contri-
butions of bauxite, finance, labour and cheap
power. This (ex ante) complementarity of interest
has also been one of the less publicised (and
sometimes less politically popular) aspects of
cooperation in the Andean Group, within which
Venezuela draws extensively upon Colombian
migrant labour and uses its oil wealth to try to
establish a regional comparative advantage in
capital intensive, energy based industry, Of
course, bland talk about 'cooperation' and 'corn-
plementarity' should not obscure the underlying
reality of non-oil ldcs searching for means of
paying more for their oil. The unequal distri-
bution of gains from ECDC is still with us, but
in a different guise.
Global preferences
One of the main features of the ECDC strategy
mapped out by UNCTAD is a system of trade
preferences between ldcs on a global scale but
without a commitment to full trade liberalisation.
The main rationale behind this idea is that the
regional schemes, whatever their advantages,
have the effect of diverting trade from other
ldcs and fostering trade within regions rather
than trade between ldc regions. It has con-
siderable unexploited potential, particularly for
products for which transport costs are not high
in relation to unit value. Moreover some of the
more industrialised ldcs are currently outside
functioning regional groups (India, Korea, Yugo-
slavia, Egypt) or else are involved in groups
which are making little headway (the LAFTA
members: Mexico, Brazil and Argentina). Global
preferences have a particular potential because
ldcs which are at a similar, relatively advanced,
stage of industrialisation have less to fear from
the polarisation of industrial development which
has been one of the most inhibiting features of
regional trade between neighbouring countries at
unequal levels of industrial attainment. There
has already been some modest progress. Sixteen
developing countries, mainly NICs, together with
Spain and Greece, negotiated a 1971 protocol
under GATT auspices which gave effect to
multilateral tariff cuts on 500 items. Trade in
these products amounted to $138 mn in 1976, a
tiny sum, but 250 per cent higher than three
years earlier when the scheme came into effect.
Yet it would be unwise to pin too many hopes
on rapid advance. The same reserve which holds
back NICs, such as Korea and Brazil, from
offering a greater degree of reciprocity in trade
negotiations with industrialised economies
operates also in their dealings with competing
countries at a similar level of development. The
production of consumer goods is usually heavily
protected either by prohibitive tariffs or a com-
bination of tariffs and quotas. In some cases this
makes eminently good developmental sense. It
is difficult for example to see any good reason
why India should open up its protected village
industries, making shoes and cloth, to com-
petition with the products of Korean or for that
matter Bangladeshi factories. Quite apart from
the political problems of countries that are still
relatively poor facing trade adjustment problems
of a magnitude which even the richest countries
are reluctant to contemplate, there are sub-
stantial technical difficulties in the way of
negotiating reciprocal concessions when the
degree of protection is very large but cannot
easily be measured. A different problem exists
with capital goods which are usually lightly pro-
tected. The degree of preference margin which
can be offered is small and of dubious value
since capital goods trade is generally not very
price sensitive.
The greater the spread of countries involved in
negotiations (in terms of levels of industrial-
isation) the greater the problems, as regional
schemes have already demonstrated. A pre-
ference scheme involving all, or at least the
most important, ldcs is likely to encounter prob-
lems which would make those of regional
schemes look petty by comparison. But its
prospects for success would be greatly enhanced
if, first, tariff and non-tariff barriers were
included, and second, if agriculture and other
raw materials could be incorporated into the
'trade-offs' amongst regional members in order
to realise the benefits of natural complemen-
tarities. After all, Western European integration
developed rather less through politicians seeing
the potential gains from industrial 'trade creation'
than from what they saw as the complementarity
of interest between German industry and French
agriculture. Amongst ldcs, common ground
could be found by exchanging trade preferences
for special terms in the purchase of raw
materials or for trading quotas under commodity
agreements. Finally, a preference scheme would
-
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be more likely to succeed if negotiation was
mainly confined to the dozen or so major NICs
with serious manufacturing interests. If a gesture
were to be made to the others it could most
usefully be in the form of granting to the 'least
developed' preferential access on a non-reciprocal
basis. Attempts to involve most of the 100+
developing countries in serious trade negotiations
would simply be unmanageable.
Trade supporting measures
Preferential trade concessions, even if agreed,
are likely to be of modest overall importance in
stimulating inter-ldc trade in relation to factors
such as the development of shipping routes,
greater familiarity with new markets, improved
export credit and clearing facilities. Not all the
present deficiencies are amenable to treatment,
at least in the short term. But something could
be done, for example, to help equalise terms on
which ldcs have to compete in the supply of
capital goods. Most industrialised countries have
the advantage of being able to offer long term
export credits and guarantees, often at below
market rates, and also tied aid. One reason for
the success of ldc capital goods exporters in the
richer oil states is that their clients will pay cash,
but this is not the case elsewhere. The establish-
ment of a competitive export credit machinery
is partly a question of expertise but mainly one
of resources.
Another difficulty arises from exchange control
and the reluctance of surplus countries to accept
settlement in non-convertible currencies. Bilateral
barter can dispose of this difficulty but it is
clumsy and constricting. Recognising the pro-
blem, the Pearson Commission recommended a
multilateral clearing system between ldcs. Nothing
has since been done globally but most regional
common markets have devised methods of hand-
ling short term imbalances, and some have
evolved mini-IMFs to provide medium term
credit to bridge longer and larger imbalances.
The larger the resources available, the greater
the scope for such arrangements; the Arab
Monetary Fund, predictably, is the most
ambitious at present.
Most UNCTAD documents have given pro-
minence to the role which might be played in
inter-ldc trade by state trading corporations, and
government-to-government contracts. These are
almost certainly likely to be less important than
ldc (privately owned) TNCs and private traders.
Because much of the literature on economic
integration has been about Latin America and
not about Asia it has tended to underestimate
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the resilience of developing country entrepreneurs
and to exaggerate the dangers of greater inter-
ldc trade being monopolised by Western com-
panies. One of the most useful supporting
measures which might be taken in support of
ECDC would be some liberalisation of inter-ldc
long term capital movements. The Indian Govern-
ment has taken steps recently to promote Indian
foreign investment through joint ventures over-
seas and this follows an already significant, and
productive, involvement by Indian firms in Africa
and South East Asia.
-
Institutions and ECDC
Current controversies over ECDC have little to
do with the relative efficacy of various methods
of promoting closer economic integration between
developing country economies. The main debate
has been about institutional arrangements for
furthering ECDC. Should there be a separate
'Third World Secretariat' apart from UNCTAD?
Should developed countries be asked to fund
projects designed to promote CSR, and if so,
what kind of voice should they be allowed in
decision making? Behind the procedural questions
there is a fundamental difference of approach.
From one point of view, ECDC can be
seen simply as an exercise in closer regional
economic integration between developing coun-
tries. This is scarcely new or controversial, and
most developed countries would happily support
it. The EEC, in search of kindred spirits, has
consciously tried to organise its external relations
around groups such as ASEAN, the Andean
Group and the Central American Common
Market. Diplomatic support has been reinforced
by small but helpful gestures of a more tangible
kind, such as the treatment of inter-regional
trade as of cumulative origin under rules of
origin requirements for trade preferences. A
great deal more help could reasonably be solicited
from the Western institutionsfinancial and
technical assistance for export credit institutions
and for the regional monetary funds; a much
wider definition of cumulative origin under GSP
schemes; a relaxation of bilateral aid-tying to
permit ldcs to purchase capital goods from each
other. But, as most ldcs recognise, the bulk of
the effort they must make themselves.
From other points of view, ECDC takes on a
different character, and particularly if the objec-
tive of welding developing countries into a much
tougher and more coherent negotiating unit is
emphasised Whilst the Group of 77 machinery
has served as a unifying force in UN meetings
(where little of real substance is decided) the
negotiating front of the ldcs has often crumbled
under pressure in difficult 'bread and butter'
negotiations, as on textile quotas. By contrast
the success of OPEC, despite internal differences,
in maintaining effective control over world oil
supplies serves as a model of what can be
achieved when circumstances are more favour-
able. Those who argue for a Third World
Secretariat believe that ldcs need a body which
can coordinate tactics, and provide detailed
briefing for technical negotiations with the
North, in which ldcs have a strong interest. The
nearest approach to such à body at present is
SELA (Latin American Economic Systems)
which was set up to provide this kind of support
for Latin American countries, though it is
difficult to see what in practice it has achieved
so far. It is understandable, given these aims,
that Idcs should wish to organise independently
of developed countries. But it is equally under-
standable that industrialised countries are
unlikely to dig into their pockets to assist a body
working directly contrary to their interests, and
are concerned about the UN being used as a
vehicle for this purpose.
It is in many ways a. pity that these two aspects
of ECDC have not been separated. It is of course
true that closer integration can lead to greater
coherence in dealing with third parties; this has
been the experience of the EEC and more
recently of ASEAN. But it is not a necessary
consequence, and the most effective example of
ldc producer organisation has been between
countries with nothing in common beyond a
(sometimes wavering) commitment to restrain
their export of oil. There is a great danger, if the
issues are confused, that the very difficult, long
term task of achieving closer economic inte-
gration between developing countries will be
submerged in the necessary but different process
of organismg the South to negotiate more
effectively with the North.
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